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‘Thinking about Sustainable Security: Metaphors, Paradoxes and Ironies’
Adam Crawford
Security as a concept is especially susceptible to textual and figurative analysis as its
meaning lies more in its usage than as something that can be defined in a philosophically
pure or analytically contained way. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde note: ‘The meaning [of
security] lies not in what people consciously think the concept means but in how they
implicitly use it in some ways and not others’ (1998: 24). Security has symbolic salience and
a self-referential quality but also a lived reality. In what follows, I wish to explore the
concept of security through the use of various tropes, notably metaphors and analogies. My
concern is not to pin down the essence of ‘security’ and display it in a decontextualized,
ahistorical and reified box where its contours, coating and demarcations can be endlessly
scrutinised, admired and critically reviewed, but rather to explore the terrain, topography,
tropography and habitat that sustain it and over which it ranges. Extending this ecological
metaphor, I go on to question the extent to which security practices are, or might be
rendered, sustainable.
Metaphors are ‘master tropes’ that describe a subject by asserting that it resembles, on
some point of comparison, another otherwise unrelated object (Manning, 2012). Thus
conceived, metaphors can serve as analytic devices that allow us to think about one thing in
terms of another. They can be useful ways of highlighting the salience and illustrating
distinctive features of a subject of investigation. They bring to our attention certain
characteristics without ever fully capturing all of the qualities of the phenomenon itself. As
used here, the metaphors deployed are designed to allow us to bring into sharp focus
particular facets and properties of security (as well as the practices, technologies and
mentalities to which they give rise) in order, to help clarify the internal dimensions of what
has otherwise been described as a ‘vague and ambiguous’ concept (Waldron, 2010: 111;
Gearty, 2013: 1). Rather like Claude Monet’s series of paintings of Rouen Cathedral,
metaphors allow us to see the same object from differing perspectives, in different lights
and under various conditions. Metaphoric thinking allows us to hold a multiplicity of points
of view and, in so doing, to see the object – security – as partaking of distinctive qualities
that should prick our awareness and inform our thinking. Nevertheless, metaphors have
their limitations. They provide resemblance, but they do not provide explanations.
Furthermore, metaphors (especially where pushed too far) can introduce confusion.
In keeping with the theme of this book, the chapter will seek to contribute to a positive
notion of security. It will do so by endeavouring to reclaim a reflexive conception of security
from the growing and somewhat dystopian (and utopian) ‘anti-security’ critique (Neocleous
and Rigakos, 2011), whilst acknowledging the dangers and malign societal impacts of which
this body of literature sagely warns us. In its place, a conception of security as distinctly
social, tied to notions of justice and legitimacy that is attentive to its temporal implications
and distributive consequences will be advanced. It sets out from the premise that an
underpinning of security is an essential prerequisite for a stable economy and vibrant
communal life, as well as for inter-subjective well-being and human flourishing. This socially
sustainable foundation necessitates that governments, businesses and societies can better
predict, prevent and mitigate threats to security but also requires the capacity of societies,
communities and individuals to adapt and live confidently with risk. The chapter seeks to
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bring a greater focus to the ethical dimensions of security (across time and space) and the
societal consequences of security practices as a framework which can be used to enable and
empower public policy and social interactions rather than simply hinder them. It
underscores the importance of ethical and cultural considerations in understanding
insecurities and public attitudes to security concerns. Hence, the chapter begins to sketch
out the normative conditions under which security policies and practices might become
socially sustainable, in that they are legitimate and just, in ways that avoid generating
malign social consequences and the erosion of other societal values or ethical principles.
The chapter is organised in two parts. The first outlines a number of metaphoric
interpretations of security in contemporary discourse to highlight its ambivalent and ironic
qualities. Particular attention is given to security’s evolving quality and social character as
well as to its temporal and distributive dimensions. The purpose is to highlight the
aggrandising and future oriented ramifications of securitising practices. The second section
briefly explores the implications of the preceding discussions for how we might conceive of
a conception of ‘sustainable security’ as a progressive notion.
1
I. Security as Metaphor
Liquid Security
Both literally and figuratively, security is on the move. As contemporary threats and
challenges to social order have become more complex and interconnected, so too, the
concept of security is no longer static but fluid; influenced by the interplay between a range
of factors, fields and forces. Understanding the shifting meaning of security is closely
connected to an appreciation of the evolving dynamics of and influences over its antonym –
‘insecurity’ (Crawford, 2002; 2010). Insecurities change and mutate, new threats emerge
and perceptions as to what measures are ‘appropriate’ in responding to these
developments shift. Social values, ethical principles, cultural norms and political sensibilities
– which mediate security demands and responses – are subject to continuous challenge and
change. Practices for dealing with security also evolve, as new technologies are fashioned
and innovations spawned. In various forms, security is in perpetual motion. Security can
thus be said to have a temporal and evolving dimension (to which we return later).
Borrowing from Bauman, Lucia Zedner (2006) develops the notion of ‘liquid security’;
highlighting its fluid, transient and dispersed character. This is exemplified both in security’s
(more recent) escape from the fixed and solid shackles which tied it to state-formation,
nationhood and identity, and in the growing operation of the private security industry. The
modern state was to be built on claiming and accumulating the legitimate monopoly of
physical force. Consequently, both conceptually and de facto, the activities of non-state -
commercial and civil society - institutions became side-lined. As Shearing (2006) has argued,
state-centred thinking came to dominate the social sciences, subsequently blinding much
analysis from understanding the governing capacities of diverse forms of non-state policing,
1
The latter section of this chapter develops upon some initial ideas outlined in a brief unpublished paper in
which the notion of ‘sustainable security’ is advanced as the basis of a research agenda (Crawford and
Hutchinson, 2013). I am grateful to Steven Hutchinson for some of the discussions and insights that informed
that paper.
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security provision and ‘private government’. Security, thus, came to be seen not only as
allied with the protection of state interests but also as a product of state activities.
However, recent decades have seen the exposure and erosion of the foundational ‘myth’
that the sovereign state is capable of delivering security and controlling crime within its
territorial boundaries and in fact whether it ever did so (Garland, 2001: 110). The resultant
predicament for modern governments has been that recognition of their limited capacities
to guarantee order and security - in the face of largely uncontrollable global flows of capital,
goods, people and risks, as well as the stubborn influence of local social ordering for
people’s safety – has politically high costs, given that political authority is so intrinsically tied
to the state’s claim to being the effective provider of security. The interconnected nature of
contemporary security risk and threats - extending beyond national territories - has both
reinforced the limited competency of the nation-state alone to control the flows of crime
and blurred the distinctions between external and internal security, as well as the roles of
the institutions fashioned to ensure them - namely the Army and Police. In a ‘liquid’ modern
world, borders and boundaries (both physical and conceptual) have become increasingly
permeable (Bauman, 2000). Global and local insecurities routinely inform and interact with
each other. It is now widely recognised that, on the one hand, policing and security
measures designed to prevent and manage international threats demand local intelligence
and responses whilst, on the other hand, the experience and salience of neighbourhood
safety is informed and influenced by international trends, conflicts and developments.
Insecurities may have their origins in injustices and conflicts experienced both locally and/or
far away, in other parts of the globe. Consequently, both the production and mitigation of
new risks is said now to lie beyond the control of the traditional nation-state, such that
national policies and state-centred political frameworks, on their own, are not capable of
governing security without substantial international co-operation and the involvement of
private, voluntary and community level organisations. Some commentators highlight a ‘de-
nationalisation’ of security, whereby networks of transnational elites increasingly define
security threats and responses to them (Bigo, 2013). But as Aas (2011) astutely notes, trans-
border connections and transnational flows do not necessarily undermine, ‘hollow out’ or
weaken nations but may be ways of achieving the goals of the national and result in
transformations in various aspects of sovereignty or statehood. Rather, the global, national
and local are increasingly enmeshed and integrated in ways that challenge conceptual
categories and political suppositions.
The spiralling costs associated with state provided security have also increasingly questioned
traditional assumptions about the umbilical cord tying security with nation-states. The
challenge to European welfare states presented by the fiscal crisis of the 1970s and the
onset of neo-liberalism has reconfigured risks – some of which were contained through
forms of social insurance. As a result, risk and the responsibility for managing it has become
increasingly ‘individualised’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2001) and privatised. In recent
years, a multiplicity of actors has become enlisted in the provision of security. The result is
recognition on the part of businesses, retailers, designers, town planners, municipal
authorities and citizens that they have a responsibility for security and the prevention of
crime risks (Crawford, 1997). This has prompted shared responsibilities and increasing
partnerships between public, private and voluntary and community organisations. Today,
security can no longer (if ever it could) be reduced to the purposive strategies of
governments in their quests to defend themselves and their citizens’ explicit interests.
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The Social Life of Security
As anthropologists and urbanists have long noted, systems of security and order have a
fundamental social basis in tacit and mutual mechanisms of social control and networks of
mundane voluntary standards (Jacobs, 1961). ‘Real security’, Molotch asserts, ‘comes from
the assemblage of artifacts, habits, and procedures which mostly are already there’ (2012:
217). Authorities, notably police and security services, ‘are better at reproducing order than
producing it’ (Hills, 2009: 208). The danger is that in the quest for security and the urge to
create apparent order, formal authorities ignore and efface existing systems of mundane
order and socially produced security. Ultimately, security is a shared and collectively
generated condition (Loader, 1997).
Security is distinctly social in that not only are objective insecurities socially produced, but so
too subjective experiences of feeling secure are socially conditioned. Perceptions of
(in)security are the subject of broad influences that are not directly connected to security
practices. Moreover, security practices themselves may generate insecurities. Hence,
attaining security as an end goal is illusive and insatiable, as absolute security is both
unattainable and a sociological non sequitur. Collective security is more than the sum of
private endeavours. Furthermore, individual security, to some considerable degree, is
dependent upon the security of others as well as general human sociability. We rely on
other people for our own security. Hence, the Commission on Human Security (2003: 2)
noted: ‘The security of one person, one community, one nation rests on the decisions of
many others – sometimes fortuitously, sometimes precariously’. Likewise, our security
measures have social consequences for others. As Loader and Walker (2007: 161)
persuasively argue: ‘there is a tendency for the quality of security… to be enhanced in the
case of any particular individual when the security of those with whom that individual
shares a social environment is also reasonably attended to’. In this regard, the very concept
of ‘private security’ may be a contradiction in terms as security is ‘implicated in the very
process of constituting the “social” or the “public”’ (p. 162).
Crucially, ‘private’ security quamarket commodity fosters the inequitable distribution of
(in)security, as those who can afford security insulate themselves from unsafe ‘others’, in
safety enclosures and secure enclaves. Whilst some groups and places experience a surfeit
of policing and security, others suffer a security deficit. Access to enhanced security through
the market is primarily determined by wealth as well as the financial and organisational
capacity of groups and businesses to form security ‘clubs’. A central paradox of security in a
market society is that there is often an inverse relationship between provision and need. In
this context, security can become a ‘positional good’ defined by wealth, access to protective
services and membership of secure enclosures. Ironically, however, such investments in
security do not necessarily resolve existential security dilemmas of individuals or groups (the
‘anxious secure’), as objective safety can - and frequently does - coexist with pervasive
subjective insecurity. Those citizens that shelter themselves in gated communities, for
example, do not necessarily experience feeling safer as a result, as they are reminded of the
insecurities that lie beyond the gates (Low, 2004).
In this regard, security as a ‘club good’ or ‘parochial collective good’, by its very nature, is
infused with a complex mix of dynamics of exclusion, combined with circuits of inclusion
(Crawford, 2006). Security clubs can result in the progressive ‘exclusion of bad risks and the
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grouping together of narrower risk pools’, in a way that ‘reinforces the residential
segregation of rich and poor achieved through “voting with the feet”’ (Jordan, 1996: 68).
Social withdrawal through investments in private or parochial security, not only reduce social
attachments to others but can prompt pressures to opt out of contribution to local or
municipal security provision. After all, why pay twice? Where residents are able to purchase
security themselves, they may prefer to withdraw from contributing to its public provision.
Such ‘civic disengagement’ may reduce the quality of the public sphere and services
provided therein. Public security in this scenario becomes a second-tier form of provision of
last resort, more geared to coercive law enforcement and the residual policing of those left
behind. Whilst private security practices sometimes have benefits that are consistent with
broader social values and the interests of wider constituencies, at other times they
adversely impinge on the public realm and serve to undermine social cohesion (Crawford,
2011). Hence, the inequitable distribution of security in favour of affluent areas and
individuals should challenge governments and civil society organisations to think creatively
about how to respond to the security deficit experienced in some of the poorer parts of
societies; and hence how to mitigate, where possible, excessive inequalities in security
distribution.
Security as Coloniser
In its movement, the concept of security also enlarges, invades and engulfs; driven by
internal dynamics and external forces, like processes of ecological succession. In so doing,
security changes the conditions of the environment into which it moves; it transforms the
landscape. Through its analytical forays, security has become an increasingly important
strategic concept through which diverse areas of economic and social life are thought about
and governed. It has become an organising idea and lexicon central to the exercise of
authority across numerous domains and, as such, is used to legitimise interventions that
have other rationales, motivations and impulses. Consequently, traditional policy domains
are now ‘governed through (in)security’ - in much the same way that Jonathan Simon (2007)
argues contemporary societies increasingly ‘govern through crime’ (cf Gagnon, 2010). To
paraphrase Simon (p. 4-5), the ‘technologies, discourses and metaphors’ of security ‘have
become more visible feature of all kinds of institutions, where they can easily gravitate into
new opportunities for governance’. The concept of security has not only colonised social
policies – such as housing, health, education and employment/workfare (so evident in the
realms of tackling anti-social behaviour) - but its promiscuity has extended farther afield.
From human well-being to global conflict, environmental survival and natural resources, the
technologies, discourses and metaphors associated with security have become increasingly
eminent features of contemporary institutions and governing bodies. We now talk of ‘food
security’ as a way of framing (and, to a degree, in place of) issues of food scarcity, shortage
and sustainability as well as inequalities of food production, supply and distribution.
2
Security ‘talk’ has become simultaneously more promiscuous, more significant and
increasingly consequential.
2
For example, the European Commission’s latest research and development framework, Horizon 2020, castes
‘food security’ as one of its six key ‘societal challenges’ alongside ‘energy security’ and ‘secure societies’ see:
http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm. Likewise, the UK government announced a Global
Food Security Programme – see: http://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/.
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This aggrandising quality of security alerts us to the possible adverse consequences of
‘securitisation’; understood as the processes through which groups of people construct
something as a ‘security threat’ and the very real consequences of conceiving issues through
the lens of ‘security’. There are well-founded fears that the high degree of influence
accorded to ‘security’ as an organising concept in the construction of societal relations may
result in public policies, their direction and funding, being redefined in terms of their
implications for (in)security and social (dis)order. A potential consequence is that
fundamental public issues can become marginalised, except in so far as they are defined in
terms of their security qualities. Other priorities may come to be viewed as no longer vital
public issues in themselves. Rather, their importance is seen to derive from the belief that
they lead to insecurity, crime and disorder. That they may do so is no reason not to assert
their value in their own right. Security thus conceived can be corrosive of other public
goods.
It is precisely this quality that scholars of ‘securitisation theory’ have highlighted (Buzan et
al., 1998; Stritzel, 2007; McDonald, 2008). They have sought to demonstrate how by
uttering the word ‘security’, an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a
designated object or group. In seeking resources, media, public or government attention,
certain threats, risk or harms can be socially constructed as sufficiently salient to warrant
security-responses. Hence, security is understood as an illocutionary speech act. Such
linguistic acts entail performing an action that creates new realities. By simply evoking
‘security’ something is being done and something demands to be done. As Wæver (2004)
notes:
‘It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real: it is the utterance itself
that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like giving a promise, betting,
naming a ship). It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one.’ (p.
13)
By voicing security, things that might ordinarily be politically untenable become not only
thinkable but acceptable, including the introduction of extraordinary or exceptional new
legislative powers or special measures. Security, thus viewed, is the result of a move that
takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue as above
‘normal politics’. The issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm
of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal
(democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making. Its implied mode of extraordinary
politics, by necessity, both institutionalises fast-track decision-making (‘process’) and
produces categories of enemy others (‘outcome’) (Aradau, 2004). This is what Buzan et al.
(1998) term ‘the securitising move’. Importantly, they underscore that securitisation only
fully occurs ‘when the audience accepts it as such’ (p. 25). It is important, therefore, to
understand the processes through which a shared understanding is constructed of what is
to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. This highlights the fact that
securitisation efforts may be contested, resisted and incomplete. Consequential
securitisation, then, is ‘the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a
saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (Wæver, 2004: 8). For Aradua (2004),
security is necessarily a negative concept as it is predicated on its production of the
friend/enemy dichotomy, in that it constitutes and delineates bodies of ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Securitisation scholars have tended to highlight the implications for formal politics of
‘securitising moves’ with less regard to the wider cultural and social consequences of
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evoking security and viewing resources, services and activities through a security lens. In
contrast to this prioritisation of formal (state) politics, there is a need to recognise and
address individual, ‘everyday’ security concerns and to move beyond the discursive level to
the lived realities of security practices of multiple actors within distinct and specific contexts
as well as the values that inform these practices. The illocutionary speech act largely denies
a meaningful role for the audience as it is not dependent upon the speech act’s acceptance
by the relevant audience (Blazacq 2005). It is not simply language that has securitising force
but the manner in which security as a concept is mobilised, institutionalised and has effects
in and through security practices, their reception and impacts. There is a tendency within
securitisation scholarship to give prominence to actors with formal powers to securitise – to
name problems as security issues – at the expense of other actors who are too often
conceived as passive recipients of securitising processes. Consequently, less attention has
been accorded to the manner in which lay sensibilities and informal processes influence,
propel or work against securitising tendencies.
The implications and outcomes of securitisation have almost exclusively been interpreted in
a negative light as undermining democracy, destabilising political values, circumventing legal
principles and eroding social relations. This has led some to lament ‘farewell to democracy
and the advent of a securitized globalized world’ (Bigo, 2008: 10). Thus understood,
securitisation represents failure; failure to address the issue within ‘normal bounds’ (Buzan
et al., 1998: 29). The optimal ambition, therefore, is desecuritisation. Less regard has been
given to how security – as a social good – is productive and is produced; by whom and in
accordance with what values. Likewise, insufficient attention has been accorded to
‘everyday security’; how it is lived, managed and fashioned in ways that enable rather than
simply constrain. Moreover, securitisation processes have tended to be construed as overly
deterministic, unilinear and totalising in their effects, with less consideration for the
unintended consequences that attend to securitising moves.
The Double-Edged Quality of Security
Conversely, I contend that one of the pivotal dynamics of security is its double-edged,
paradoxical and precarious nature. It is both a necessary precondition for sociability and a
constraint upon it. As such, it has both positive and negative attributes; in the sense of
security as a protection from harms, threats and risks (‘security from’ - its negative shield-
like quality) and security as fostering the conditions that empower people to engage in
certain pursuits (‘security to’ – its enabling, foundational quality). Hoogensen and colleagues
(2009: 3) elaborate:
‘Security is achieved when individuals and/or multiple actors have the freedom to
identify risks and threats to their well-being and values (negative security), the
opportunity to articulate these threats to other actors, and the capacity to determine
ways to end, mitigate or adapt to those risks and threats either individually or in
concert with other actors (positive security).’
Yet, there are evident dangers implicit in the quest for positive notions of security and
explicit in Hoogensen’s (2012) work in constructing unhelpful and overly-solid binaries:
negative/positive; bad/good; constraining/enabling; violent/non-violent; state/individual;
securitising/emancipatory; and so on. Rather, these ambiguous qualities of security need to
be understood as porous, interacting and interconnected in ways that produce ambivalence
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and ironies. These paradoxical facets of security inform and are illustrated by two analogies
that we now turn to consider.
1. Security as Ambulance
In deploying security as a discursive lens for framing all sorts of policy debates, the danger is
that security takes on the analogous quality of an ambulance: imparting urgency, impending
consequences and the suspension of erstwhile norms – the usual ‘rules of the game’.
Huysmans (2004: 332) remarks on how securitisation institutionalises ‘speed’ against the
relative slowness of normal politics: ‘Calls for speed not only question the viability of
deliberation and a contest of opinion; they also support strengthening executive-centred
government, and suppress dissent’. Just as the accepted norms are suspended for the
perceived higher good of saving lives as the ambulance rushes to its destination, so too, the
values and principles (both procedural and substantive) of everyday life are routinely
suspended in the name of ‘security’. The associated mobilisation of political and economic
resources can lead to the trumping of other values, the stifling of debate and the side-lining
of counter-veiling interests. ‘Rather than debate and deliberation, securitisation calls for
silence and speed’ (Roe, 2012: 252, emphasis in original). So too, the noise from the
ambulance’s siren drowns out other sounds or voices. This ‘securitisation’ of social life can
thus be thought of as a consequential condition in which issues and problems are
depoliticised and alternative ways of framing and responding to problems of order are set
aside or suspended (Wæver, 1995). In the process, it is not just the realm of politics that is
refigured; so too is the wider moral and cultural order.
The pursuit of security thus can become a justification for what Ericson (2007: 27) terms
‘counter-law’, whereby: ‘New laws are enacted and new uses of existing law are invented to
erode or eliminate traditional principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law that get
in the way of pre-empting imagined sources of harm’. In this light, ‘the counter-law of
security is designed to trump law that seeks to protect citizens from excesses of security’ (p.
163). Under certain circumstances, therefore, security becomes less a public good and more
a corrosive toxin that eats away at social and ethical norms and values of a society; resulting
in the perverse reality of ‘too much security’ (Zedner, 2003). Whilst deliberate inaction in
the face of evidence of possible serious risks and irreversible harm is understandably
hazardous, so too over-reaction and too great an emphasis on security can at times present
greater dangers, particularly where this generates unintended securitising consequences
and results in the consumption of resources that might have been deployed in more socially
beneficial endeavours.
This use of law to enhance securitisation has been particularly prominent in the post-9/11
context of counter-terrorism reforms, where the threat of terrorist violence has been used
to erode traditional legal rights and side-step due process (Zender, 2007). Since 9/11, the
scope and substance of the criminal law – notably in Anglo-American jurisdictions – has
undergone significant change (Ashworth and Zedner, 2012). The quest for security has
prompted new offences of inchoate and pre-inchoate liability, as well as a wider preventive
focus of criminalization. However, it would be wrong to suggest that 9/11 was the sole
catalyst provoking this seismic shift. A preventive logic was well entrenched and forms of
counter-law had already established a secure footing prior to the events of 9/11. In the UK,
for instance, the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 ushered a decidedly preventive focus of
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criminalisation, as well as the introduction of novel hybrid civil/criminal preventive orders in
the form of the ASBO.
3
As a result, a new category of behaviours defined loosely as ‘anti-
social’ became the subject of pre-emptive criminalisation (Crawford, 2009). In elaborating
his ‘counter-law’ thesis, Ericson (2007: 159-67) draws upon the ASBO as an archetypal
example of the manner in which ‘substantive laws are reformed and reinterpreted within a
precautionary logic’ (p. 25). Contemporary security threats from terrorist violence, through
‘ordinary’ crime to acts of disorder and anti-social behaviour, undoubtedly present real and
pressing challenges for governments, businesses and citizens alike. But there are evident
dangers that in the way in which we both interpret risks and respond to them, we may end
up undermining some of the core values and principles of justice, whilst simultaneously
erode relations of social trust and mutual toleration.
But the ambulance also captures a dimension that is often lost among securitisation
scholars, namely the positive possibilities of security. The suspension of normal politics
through processes that combine silence and speed only produce morally unacceptable
outcomes if we value democratic decision-making above everything else. It also
presupposes that ‘normal politics’ conforms to certain democratic and deliberative ideals,
which, in practice, are often absent. The ambulance reminds us that silence and speed – and
the suspension of ‘normal rules’ – in certain circumstances may be morally appropriate.
Pursuing this line of thinking, Floyd (2010: 4) contends: ‘If, for instance, we value the
reduction of human wretchedness in the world above all else, then the suspension of
ordinary politics is morally permissible, provided that human beings are the beneficiaries of
security policies, and not power holders and elites’. The key, therefore, is to identify the
conditions under which proportionate ‘speed’ and parsimonious ‘silence’ become morally
justifiable. Nonetheless, the enduring cautionary concern is that the ambulance increasingly
comes to take the form of juggernaut, as security develops its own momentum and
direction of travel.
2. Security as Foundational Building Blocks
The earlier discussed evolving and promiscuous quality of security is also aptly captured in
the increasingly in vogue, yet capacious, notion of ‘human security’. This broadens the focus
of security concerns to encompass a wide-range of interconnected facets of human
development and fundamental rights that enhance and protect the ‘vital core’ of individual
freedoms and fulfilment. In so doing, it underscores the foundational human condition and
essence of security. Human security is understood as a condition that results from an
effective political, economic, social, cultural and natural environment (Alkire, 2003: 3). It is
protective in the sense that it seeks to safeguard the rights and freedoms that pertain to
survival, livelihood and basic dignity. As well as encompassing a diverse range of threats and
harms, it centres security on people not states (Axworthy, 2001). It reinforces the break
from state-centric assumptions about the state as the primary referent for security. Instead,
human security places individuals centre stage and attributes to them universal qualities
that demand protection. It asserts that people matter as much as states and, in the process,
3
The hybrid and preventive regulatory model introduced by the ASBO was adapted and transplanted to other
realms such as the terrorism-inspired ‘control order’ (Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005), the alcohol-related
‘drinking banning order’ (Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006) and the organised crime-associated ‘serious crime
prevention order’ (Serious Crime Act 2007).
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revises our understanding of state sovereignty constrained by the rights of individuals. Kofi
Annan (1999) has alluded to the notion of ‘individual sovereignty’ to capture this
transformation. As such, human security is both individualistic and explicitly universalistic in
its aspirations. It embeds security in common values rather than national interests. As a
consequence, it introduces the language of morals and values into a discourse that
otherwise largely relies on (state) interests. It creates obligations and responsibilities; to
invest and provide, as well as to prevent and protect. Furthermore, it incorporates diverse
actors and organisations – notably civil society institutions - into the fold of both security
providers and the producers of insecurity.
The United Nations has done much to endorse and foster the concept of human security
(UNDP, 1994), which has also found its way into EU policy debates (Albrecht et al., 2007).
Proponents have used the concept to generate a wider public debate focused on addressing
the ‘security gap’ experienced by many around the world, notably those living in poverty
and disadvantage. In many senses, human security has emerged as a practice in search of a
theory. For some, the notion of human security is directly linked to humanitarian
intervention and the idea of a global civil society (Kaldor, 2007). From this perspective, it has
been closely associated with the development of the ‘responsibility to protect’ and the work
of the Canadian Government sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (2001).
By shifting attention from the causes of insecurity to the prerequisites of peaceful co-
existence and development, human security is considered to be less ‘defensive’ in character
and productive of more creative concerns for capacity building and enhancing human
dignity. From this perspective, security is seen as analogous to the foundational building
blocks on which the architecture of human capabilities and community cohesion are
constructed. The Commission on Human Security (2003: 4) defines human security as:
‘protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and
human fulfilment’... [It] means protecting fundamental freedoms - freedoms that are
the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive
(widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s
strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic,
military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival,
livelihood and dignity.’
Thus conceived, security is an essential prerequisite for liberty and informs the constitution
of fundamental freedoms (Gearty, 2013). It represents the foundations upon which good
governance, individual fulfilment, collective well-being and the commonweal are grounded.
Annan (2000) elaborated this in declaring: ‘Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the
freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment - these are the
interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national, security’. Reflecting the
expanding range of human security, he subsequently added a fourth freedom; ‘freedom to
live in dignity’ by promoting the rule of law, human rights and democracy (Annan, 2005).
Importantly, he sought to root human dignity in both freedom via human rights and
security, thus tying together liberty in and through security. Accordingly, human security
underscores the inter-linkages between security, development and human rights as well as
the universality and interdependence of a set of freedoms that are fundamental to human
life. Not only are freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity tied inextricably to
freedom from fear as interconnected foundational building blocks of human flourishing, but
Forthcoming in B. Oude Breuil, L. Merckx, M. Schuilenburg and R. van Steden (eds) Positive
Criminology: Unexplored Thoughts on Security, The Hague: Eleven Publishing, 2014.
11
so too, poverty, inequality, environmental degradation and a lack of dignity are seen as
harbingers of future insecurities and conflicts. As such, human security also demands an
integrated approach to these interconnected elements.
Whilst the breadth of human security as a concept has been useful in licensing and justifying
wide-ranging policies of intervention and the deployment of diverse strategies in support of
humanitarian protection and democracy promotion, it has also been characterised by some
as ‘conceptually sloppy’, ‘too warm and fuzzy’ and vague to the point that specific security
policies are left without much guidance or direction (Khon, 2001; Martin and Owen, 2010).
For Newman (2004: 358), this leaves human security as ‘a normatively attractive but
analytically weak concept’. Troublingly, the pervasiveness of human security as a term
ushers, in its wake, processes of securitisation. New threats and new actors are drawn into
the vortex of ‘governing through security’. Matters as all-embracing and subjective as well-
being, dignity, respect and human development (Nussbaum, 2011), all become caught up in
the logic of securitisation. Conversely, this highlights the possibility that the more capacious
security becomes, the more it may come to be diluted of its negative securitising dynamics
and implications. To do so, however, necessitates attention to ethical principles with which
to assess the normative acceptability of specific security practices under particular
conditions, given their likely consequences.
Furthermore, from this perspective, security and justice – likewise human security and
human rights - are viewed as complementary and mutually reinforcing foundations. Little
attention is accorded to the ambiguous and tense relation between the two. For some,
human security is a vehicle for advancing and rallying slogan for promoting a human rights
agenda. However, human rights and human security are not the same. The former provides
a normative framework with entitlements and obligations that focus on the correlative
duties of other parties, while the latter operates at the level of politics as a policy tool. If
used interchangeably or confused, human security may dilute the legal character of human
rights, such that: ‘the precision and legality of the human rights framework could suffer if
too closely allied with the ambiguity and mere rhetorical appeal of human security’
(Petrasek, 2004: 59). Oberleitner (2005) conjures up the wonderfully evocative image of the
relationship between human rights and human security as ‘porcupines in love’; close yet
problematic! He warns against the dangers of securitising human rights in ways that erode
their indivisible quality and universality; allowing for a ‘pick and choose’ approach on the
grounds of the value of given rights for security (Alkire, 2003: 39). Human security
recognises that some human rights conflict with one another and that in real-life situations
of limited resources or in the face of political will some prioritisation is needed. However,
this may invite governments to avoid human rights obligations under the pretext of
protecting human security. Accordingly, this could have the effect of diluting human rights
or trumping them with superior human security claims. Reconstructing human rights as
human security accentuates the prospect that security is taken to be the desired end.
One emblematic example of where security as ambulance and security as foundation collide
is the mobilisation of the right to security as a foundational right (Shue, 1996) or type of
‘super human right’ (Taylor, 2004). Proponents of a ‘right to security’ frequently draw
justification through reference to discourses of human security whereby security is seen as a
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fundamental human right – for some ‘the basic right on which all others are based’.
4
Whilst
human rights may frequently be used to limit the excesses of security, the nature of the
relationship between human rights, security and justice cannot be depicted simply within a
framework in which human rights serve as a limit on the coercive reach of the criminal law
and state institutions or act as a counterweight to criminalisation and securitisation. As
Lazarus (2007) has shown, assertions of the right to security can imply, and have been
increasingly exploited politically to presage, greater powers of surveillance, increased police
authority, wider use of pre-trial detention and pre-emptive measures aimed at risk
prevention. Attempts to cast the right to security as a meta-right, and subsequently to re-
order the priority of rights, thus, run the risk that rights themselves will become securitised
(Lazarus, 2011). Rather than justice and rights to liberty being conceived as pathways to
security, they may come to be seen as products of security. From this perspective, security
becomes the precondition for the enjoyment of any right. The danger here, however, is that
we may become preoccupied with the quest for security as the precondition to liberty to
the extent that we end up with enhanced security but with scant liberty.
II. Sustainable Security
This prompts consideration of the nature of the vexed relation between security and liberty.
More often than not, the metaphor that is conjured up in contemporary policy debate
about the security-liberty relation is the image of balance. Recently, the notion of ‘striking a
new balance between security and liberty’ implies the notion of trade-offs. As Waldron
(2010: 22) notes, frequently when the balance metaphor is invoked it is deployed by those
who wish to take up a new position on the issue with regard to the pre-eminence of security
and a change in attitudes to civil liberties. Talk of (re-)balancing evokes the idea of finely
grained calculations of weights and measures that can be objectively assessed and
calibrated (i.e. Home Office, 2006). It presupposes that liberty and security are ‘eternal
values’, that they are easily differentiable, quasi-quantifiable and homogeneous (Bigo, 2010:
398). By contrast, security and liberty are better understood as incommensurate goods in
which no simple equilibrium can be struck, but where their relationship demands open
deliberation and contestation in relation to other social values, norms and goals.
In the language of balance, intra-personal trade-offs are often confused with inter-personal
trade-offs (Waldron 2010: 12). Intra-personal trade-offs are where individuals accept certain
constraints on their own liberty in order to render themselves (and possibly others) more
safe and secure; where each of us bears the costs of security whilst simultaneously each of
us reaps the benefits. By contrast, inter-personal trade-offs – more problematically – occur
where we sacrifice not our own liberty but the liberty of others in order that the rest of us
may be (or feel) more safe. Such trade-offs highlight the distributive qualities of security
measures, whereby the burdens of security may fall unevenly across the population. Many
of the contemporary changes advocated to enhance security, actually protect the security of
some whilst overlooking or actively undermining the security of others. They have adverse
implications for and impacts on marginal and marginalised groups within societies; those
upon whom dominant groups project their fears and anxieties.
4
As articulated in May 2007 by the then Home Secretary, John Reid, in a speech delivered in Venice to
ministers of the six largest EU nations – see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6648849.stm
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Hence, in confronting the distributive mix of security and liberty, we need to reflect upon
the questions: ‘whose fears?’, ‘whose security?’ and ‘whose liberty?’ is being enhanced or
diminished. These are particularly salient questions for the uneven distribution of security
across different social groups: men/women and minorities/majorities. Such questions,
however, are less evident in debates about threats of terrorism and political violence, as
well as other contemporary fears and responses to them. Nevertheless, in the political
confrontation between fear and liberty, where necessary, actions that infringe liberties are
more evidently justifiable if those who support the actions are burdened by them and their
impacts are not restricted to members of identifiable minority groups - whether implicitly or
through differential implementation.
Drawing together the metaphors and analogies outlined thus far, in thinking about how we
might conceive the relation between security and liberty, the following sets of relationships
are suggestive:
1. Inversely related in that more of one produces less of the other - as in the
metaphoric balance – whereby the notion of ‘trade off’ implies that enhancing
security demands corresponding reductions in liberty and visa versa.
2. Mutually reinforcing suggests a relation in which the two are interconnected and
can enrich each other – possibly to the extent that they constitute each other –
evoking ‘liberty in security’ and ‘security in liberty’.
3. Security as a precondition for liberty evokes the earlier analogy of security as
foundational building block, whereby security is a prerequisite for the exercise of
rights and the enjoyment of liberties.
4. Security as precluding liberty evokes the securitising tendencies of the ambulance
cum juggernaut captured in ‘counter-law’.
5. Liberty as a precondition for security implies that normative principles of justice,
human rights protections and experiences of fairness and equality of treatment may
be fundamental pathways to security; evoking ‘security through liberty’.
6. Precariousness suggests a relationship that is simultaneously close but problematic
and ambiguous; as conjured by Oberleitner’s ‘porcupines in love’.
It is with regard to a combination of these last two relationships that I wish to elaborate a
conception of sustainable security, in my concluding thoughts.
As already identified, security has both temporal and socio-spatial, distributive dimensions.
First, temporality is central to all security projects and informs experiences and prospects of
security (Valverde, forthcoming). Unlike the retrospective gaze of criminal justice - that
seeks normatively to reorder the past - security looks to what is to come. Not only does
security continually evolve and transmute as a concept (as threats and risks as well as
practices and technologies change), but so too, security has a future-orientation. Security is
concerned not simply with managing present threats and risks but also with governing as
yet unknown futures. When we think of our safety, we think not just of the present moment
but project into the future. Hence, technologies, mentalities and practices of security offer
assurances about the future and generate expectations that people can count on and build
upon (to continue the architectural metaphor). Yet, in anticipation, we project towards the
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future, but what comes out of the future is our past, our inter-subjective and culturally
informed assumptions, experiences and beliefs that all inform our insecurities.
Moreover, security practices and securitisation moves have both short-term implications
and longer-term consequences – they exert an evident temporality. The evolving and
interdependent nature of security problems means that nothing done to solve one security
hazard is without impacts. As Molotch (2012: 219) notes: ‘this sets up the need for
continuous change and refinement – with no end ever’. Security practices and discourses,
he argues, too often presume ‘finality’; ‘armour in place, bad guys dead or behind bars,
instead of ongoing attentiveness to ranges of interacting opportunities and constraints’
(ibid.). Troublesomely, today’s quests for security in their myopic attempts to control
present risks and assuage extant fears, scatter the future with sources of impending
insecurities. For example, the suspension of normal codes and recourse to ‘emergency
measures’ – be it extraordinary rendition, extra-judicial hearings or other forms of ‘counter-
law’ - may provide temporary relief, but will often have ramifications that reverberate into
the future. More mundanely, these may have an incremental and accumulated
acculturation and normalising effects – whereby over time the exception becomes the norm
in an undefined ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) or ‘permanent state of emergency’
(Bigo, 2010) – and/or may generate legitimacy deficits that undermine social trust. Yet, trust
and legitimacy are precious ingredients in shared experiences of security. Like other forms
of authority and power, public security systems seek to generate commitments to
compliance and cooperation. In this, judgements about the legitimacy of legal authorities
and security apparatuses – people and systems - are crucial to why people obey the law and
comply with decisions taken (Tyler, 2006). Hence, the urgent ‘now’ (ambulance-like)
dimension of security, if experienced as illegitimate, can serve to undermine future security.
Second, security is socially and spatially variegated. The existence of excessive security
differentials and uneven distribution of safety have the capacity to exacerbate and
compound extant inequalities. So too, they can foster inter-group or inter-personal tensions
and social conflicts. Thus, spatial and social inequalities in security, like illegitimate security,
can generate vicious circles and malign feedback loops across time. In many senses, security
expresses the ‘intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships’ (Bakhtin 1990:
84). It is here that the notion of sustainable security has some purchase.
The concept of ‘sustainability’ has most often been deployed in environmental studies and
human development. In these contexts, sustainability is characterised in terms of meeting
short-term needs without compromising future generations’ capacity to meet their own
needs (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). Central are the
concepts of needs and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social
organisation on the ability to meet present and future needs. The notion of ‘social
sustainability’ implies interdisciplinary insights in its connections with economic and
environmental sustainability, but privileges societal values and social norms. To furnish
sustainable societies, we need to better understand and to seek to change practices and
behaviours that are unsustainable; those that, in a security context, undermine ethical
principles, normative values and promote inequalities that foster future conflicts and
insecurities. Sustainable security practices, therefore, can be defined as those that meet the
needs of the present without compromising the well-being of the future through adverse
societal impacts, depletion of other fundamental social values, such as trust and legitimacy,
or erosion to principles of freedom, due process or equity of treatment.
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Like security, sustainability expresses temporality; it is an ongoing process, evincing
movement, responding to change and requiring open-ended reflection, not a fixed state to
be achieved. Hence, the notion of ‘sustainable security’ is useful in that it foregrounds the
temporal and spatial unevenness of security practices and their implications for peoples’
liberties and freedoms, as well as experiences of (in)justice both in the present and in the
future. In addition to its analytical attributes, the notion of sustainable security has
normative and political properties. First, it foregrounds equity of access to key goods and
services as a prerequisite of sustainable communities, in that inequities bread insecurities.
As such, security should not be treated as a good simply to be maximised, but rather as
something to be achieved as far as possible at an equal level for all; to minimise inequities of
distribution. Second, it underscores equity between generations, in that future generations
should not be disadvantaged by the activities of the current generation. Third, it challenges
the neo-liberal triumphalism of the market as the distributor of social utility by providing
space for the recognition of the moral limits of markets (in the provision of security), and in
so doing subordinates economic goals to social values (Sandel, 2012).
A conception of sustainable security seeks precisely to reconcile short-term security needs
that enable people to adapt and live confidently with threat and risk, with longer-term goals
of developing a functioning, legitimate and normatively viable security system. It follows
that the sustainability of security practices as public goods necessitates not only the
construction of a just society in the present, but also the design of arrangements and
procedures that secure lasting and continuing (social) justice in the future. This involves not
only being attentive to the capacity of security measures to impact disproportionately on
specific groups or unduly discriminate against them, but to be reflexive in terms of the
constantly changing social, environmental, economic, political and legal climate in which
security is enacted. Such an endeavour will necessitate consideration of the role of justice
principles and the rule of law as vital stepping stones along the pathway to legitimate and
sustainable forms and levels of security. This underscores the requirement to attend to the
short-term security needs of living with risk and threat in contemporary societies in which
uncertainty prevails without prompting social injustices and amplified inequalities or
compromising future security by generating new sources of insecurities. The goal is to
contain and restrict the prevalence and harmful consequences of the exceptional
emergency (ambulance-like) and counter-legal qualities of security whilst facilitating its
legitimate and well-being protective characteristics.
Security is frequently identified as a core component of what makes resilient and
‘sustainable communities’ (Raco, 2007). Yet, the role of security logics and practices in
sustaining the vitality of communal life and security as a positive social good and lived
reality are little understood. Aligning security with the notion of sustainability, begs a
number of useful allied questions: to what extent and in what ways do security practices,
discourse and technologies sustain and promote equitable, inclusive and just societies? To
what extent are they socially sustainable? Conversely, to what extent and in what ways do
quests for security in seeking to meet short-term demands compromise the security of
future generations? Sustainability is ultimately bound up with institutional design, social
practices and human behaviour. As such, it opens up debate, negotiation and contestation
over preferred futures, under conditions of deep contingency and uncertainty. Hence, the
appeal of sustainable security as an idea resides in its capacity to operate as an integrating
framework; as a way of thinking about the relationships between different dimensions that
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constitute security as a practice and ideal, rather than simply as a barometer for assessing
the justifiability or otherwise of a specific component of security.
In foregrounding a conception of ‘sustainable security’ (as a positive notion), a future
research agenda will need to connect extant ways of thinking about security with key
normative principles and values of social justice and legitimacy which shape both its current
and longer-term pursuit. These will need to include concern for both substantive and
distributive justice and fairness. In so doing, it will need to connect with and support human
rights discourses while attentive to the differences and interconnections between human
rights and (human) security. Such an approach must go beyond overly simplistic binaries and
balancing acts between ‘security’ and ‘liberty’, as if these exist in some direct hydraulic
relation. It will also need to avoid any implication that attempts to enhance security
inevitably lead automatically to some type of rights-related infringements and that
enhancing rights leads to increased insecurity. This requires us to conceive of the
relationship between security and liberty as a recursive relationship in which security is also
seen as a platform for well-being and human autonomy - for the exercise of freedom.
In this vein, Rita Floyd (2011) specifies three criteria that, if fulfilled at the same time, would
render securitisation morally right. These are that: first, there is an objective existential
threat; second, the referent object of security is morally legitimate; and third, the security
response is appropriate to the threat in question. This forms part of, what she terms, a ‘just
securitisation theory’ (Floyd 2014) which interrogates and seeks to build criteria for
assessing the morality of both securitisation and de-securitisation. This demands that
attention is given to thresholds and questions about principles of proportionality – not
simply from a legal or normative perspective but also in terms of a more nuanced and
descriptive sociology of seriousness. Hence, how do we evaluate the seriousness of security
threats and risks? What is the evidential basis upon which security threats become
actionable? What are the appropriate thresholds for securitisation? In this regard, the
Commission on Human Security (cited earlier) has proposed to restrict its focus to ‘critical’
and ‘pervasive’ threats, be they environmental, economic, food health, personal or political.
Such a threshold-based conception cuts across and challenges both narrow and broad
interpretations of human security (Owen, 2004). But much more need be done to elaborate
upon this.
The preceding arguments have sought to underscore the significance of tacit security
mechanisms, mundane order and the quotidian needs, conditions and practices of ordinary
people. Traditional notions of security have been criticised for their rigidity in relation to
insufficiently incorporating the views and experiences of minority groups and women in
particular (Hansen, 2000). Any sustainable understanding of security must explore how
security and its evolution have been gendered in the past and might be influenced by
changing gender relations in the future. Ironically, perhaps, the etymology of the word
‘security’ derives from the Latin root securus which literally means ‘without care’. Care in
this sense refers to anxiety, fear or worry. Hence, to be secure is to be ‘carefree’. This
juxtaposition of security and care belies a deeper association between the two terms in that
security presupposes care – feelings of attachment and sociability. One can only be truly
‘carefree’ where there are ongoing, routine and tacit systems of sharing, relations of care,
and forms of resilience that constitute a latent benign social environment. It is self-evident
to suggest that relations of care – like forms of mundane security - are profoundly
gendered.
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Despite its universalising implications, human security - like human rights and the liberal
political tradition from which it borrows – embodies a model of the autonomous, rational
human subject who is the bearer of capabilities and of individual rights (Gilligan, 1982)
which sits awkwardly with the situated and relational quality of social power that mediates
much human life, structural inequalities, violence and insecurities and, in particular,
women’s experiences of them (Nussbaum, 2005). Moreover, the logic of rights pays
insufficient attention to an ‘ethics of care’ (Kittay, 1999; Robinson, 2011). However, as
Marhia notes: ‘There is no a priori formula for intervening in these relations: this requires
situated empirical analyses and is inevitably (and productively) a source of contestation’
(2013: 32). Nevertheless, in order to address the uneven global and local distribution of
vulnerabilities and insecurities, any notion of sustainable security must do more than secure
the individual; it must acknowledge and nurture the ‘social life of security’.
Conclusion
At the same time, we need to be aware of the limitations and misuses of notions of
sustainability, notably in the context of security. First, sustainability has a consequentialist
(ends-oriented) logic in which future security needs may be used as a trump to present day
individual rights and civil liberties. Human rights discourses, by contrast, are non-
consequentialist. We need to be careful that under conditions of uncertainty, worst-case
scenarios (Sunstein, 2007) do not promote precautionary logics that stifle civil liberties and
side-line legal norms of due process in order to intervene at the earliest possible stage to
stop our (as yet) unknown demons surfacing (Crawford, 2010).
Secondly, it has been argued by some that the language of sustainability - drawn from the
apocalyptic scenarios over climate change has a tendency to depoliticise and de-
democratise debate and constitute a key arena through which ‘the post-political frame is
forged, configured and entrenched’ (Swyngedouw, 2010: 216). Swyngedouw contends that:
‘Much of the sustainability argument has evacuated the politics of the possible, the
radical contestation of alternative future socio-environmental possibilities and socio-
natural arrangements, and has silenced the antagonisms and conflicts that are
constitutive of our socio-natural orders by externalizing conflict. It is inherently
reactionary.’ (p. 228)
By contrast, a progressive notion of sustainable security should seek to politicise the values
and moral choices upon which security decisions are premised. In so doing, it should open
up debate and dialogue about our conceptions of security, the practices to which they give
rise and their social implications. Consequently, there is a need for an expansion in the
policy and critical imaginations that are used to categorise, diagnose and provide solutions
to security problems. This will require, amongst other things, a re-imagination of the long-
term socio-economic causes of insecurities and their distribution across time and space. This
means acknowledging the interconnections between local violence and vulnerabilities, such
as domestic violence, and global violence and vulnerabilities, such as war and social
conflicts.
Thus envisaged, security constitutes a radical vantage point from which to consider
questions of social sustainability. As Molotch contends: ‘Security entails thinking critically
and in a comprehensive manner about present strategies and questioning them – at general
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levels as well as in specific detail’ (2012: 217, emphasis in original). Demands for ‘more
security’ should invite fundamental examinations of societal values. They require us to
attend to judgements both about the present and the future based on normative principles
informed by empirical evidence of existing security practices; both those of authorities and
of the everyday, mundane and ordinary social means by which people manage their lives.
In sum, an understanding of ‘sustainable security’ needs to be attentive; first, to the
temporal and distributive dimensions of security; second, to the capacity of security
measures to impact disproportionately on specific minority groups or unduly discriminate
against them; and third, to the manner in which minority voices and gender dimensions are
frequently silenced in security debates. Such an approach should seek to investigate how
security is produced, by whom and informed by what values. It should also seek to identify
the conditions under which security practices can turn from vicious into virtuous circles, and
the norms and values that inform the long-term sustainability of security measures and
processes. Moreover, it needs to develop a more nuanced understanding of the
interconnections and interactions between security and liberty. Following Bigo (2010: 415),
it will need to give ‘more serious attention to liberty as the condition of existence of any
account of security that claims scholarly pretension’.
5
Finally, context matters. A normative
approach alone does not take us far enough. In the study of what constitutes sustainable
security, there is an evident need to supplement normative and analytical enquiries about
logics, dynamics and attributes of security and securitisation processes, with a robust
empirical examination and critical interpretation of given security practices and lived
experiences in particular locales. We need to know more about what ‘security looks and
feels like to different actors’ working in specific settings (Ranasinghe, 2013: 104). In this, a
research agenda focused around sustainable security will need to be attentive to questions
of temporal and spatial scale (Valverde, 2011). It will also need to interrogate the manner in
which the ambiguities, paradoxes and ironies outlined in this paper are played out and
influenced by ordinary people in habitual settings, as well as by elites at particular moments
in history, through specific security projects. Last but not least, it will need to play close
attention to the implications of current (and past) security endeavours for future security
practices and the wider social forces that shape tomorrow’s insecurities.
5
Bigo goes on to argue for the development of ‘liberty studies’ to ‘go beyond critical security studies’ (2010:
413).
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